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Abstract
We study how attempts to regulate cryptocurrencies, or at least to mit-
igate the harm they do, are misdirected. We started by looking at how one
might blacklist stolen bitcoin, and find that two established legal principles
– the nemo dat rule and the Clayton’s case precedent – make tracing crime
proceeds much simpler than researchers previously thought; they support a
first-in first-out rule for taint tracking, which turns out to be much more effi-
cient. However once we published initial results and were approached by theft
victims, we discovered a more serious problem. Many bitcoin exchanges do
not now give their customers actual bitcoin, but rather do off-chain transac-
tions with other exchange customers or transact on customers’ behalf with
outsiders. Except where customers withdraw cryptocurrency into self-hosted
wallets, the ownership of these assets is unclear. The number of off-blockchain
transactions has increased enormously in the last eighteen months; we can’t
find good figures but the volume is sufficient to raise serious concerns and the
practice falls under e-money regulations that are not being enforced. In short,
the security, economics and regulatory problems of cryptocurrencies in 2018
turn out to be rather different from those described in the academic literature.
The real problem is that we are seeing the emergence of a shadow banking sys-
tem. Cryptocurrencies do not solve the underlying problems that made bank
regulation necessary, and we sadly predict that many of the familiar second-
order problems will also reappear. We discuss the implications for regulating
cryptocurrencies and smart contracts more generally, and suggest eight things
that regulators and central banks might usefully do.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin has become “a combination of a bubble, a Ponzi scheme and an environ-
mental disaster,” according to the Bank for International Settlements [Car18]. An
idealistic experiment – in which cypherpunks tried to create a currency independent
of central banks – went viral after the 2008-9 financial crisis. With its peak valua-
tion of over $840bn exceeding Apple’s market cap, the cryptocurrency bubble has
attracted ever more speculators, ever more implausible startups and ever more at-
tempts at regulation. The energy consumed by miners now exceeds that of Ireland,
and is six times that of Europe’s biggest wind farm [Her17]. Europol estimates that
3–4% of Europe’s crime proceeds are laundered through cryptocurrencies, with the
figure rising rapidly [Eur17]. New criminal applications have emerged, from online
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drug markets to ransomware, and helped drive demand for bitcoin. Some of them
may become permanent even if bitcoin disappears completely (now that its value
fluctuates wildly, ransomware authors demand Amazon gift vouchers instead). The
latest crime wave is bitcoin robberies – where investors in cryptocurrencies are held
up at gunpoint and forced to transfer large sums on the spot to the robbers [Pop18].
The question of how to track and recover stolen bitcoin is urgent.
When asked by policymakers what might be done, technologists tend to be pes-
simistic: the cryptography appears sound, and as there’s no-one in charge for the
courts to go after, there’s no obvious pressure point.
We beg to differ. Time and again, tech firms have challenged incumbent firms
by circumventing an established industry’s rules and regulations. Sometimes the
outcome has been beneficial: online travel bookings make life easier than it was under
old-fashioned travel agents, and online rating services make it more predictable.
Sometimes we just replace one set of oligopolists by another: iTunes, YouTube and
Spotify have displaced and impoverished the music majors. And sometimes the
results are unpleasant. The cosy taxi monopolies in many cities may have been
ripe for a shake-up; but when Uber started letting drivers work sixteen hours a day,
failed to perform background checks on drivers and didn’t report crimes against
passengers, mayors acted. It was not enough for the company to say “We’re not
a taxi company, we’re a platform.’ They were found to be a taxi company soon
enough, and in some cities – such as London – their license was withdrawn.
In many application areas, from taxis and hotels through insurance broking and
air travel to health services, the solution turns out to be simple: just find ways to
enforce the rules we already have. They have evolved over decades or even centuries
and tend to fit their industries fairly well.
Our question in this paper is therefore whether the harm that cryptocurrencies
do could be mitigated using existing laws and existing regulatory structures with at
most very minor tweaks. We will answer this question cautiously in the affirmative.
To do so we need to consider not just blockchain technology in the abstract, but
actual industry practice and the relevant law and economics.
The contributions of this paper are to analyse how the law of stolen goods and
existing financial regulations can create a natural framework in which the proceeds
of crime can be traced in an efficient and incentive-compatible way. Section 2 deals
with the issues of private and public law; section 3 with the shortcomings of exist-
ing approaches to blockchain tainting and bitcoin due diligence, and what a better
approach would look like in both technical and business terms; section 4 presents
empirical results, and section 5 describes the actual operation of the cryptocurrency
markets; section 6 discusses policy options, and section 7 summarises our conclu-
sions.
We turn to the law first.
2 Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet
‘No-one can give what they don’t own’ is a rough translation of this section’s title,
an established principle of nearly all systems of law. If Alice steals Bob’s horse and
sells it to Charlie, Charlie doesn’t end up owning it; when Bob sees him riding it,
he can simply demand it back. This is natural justice; the horse wasn’t Alice’s to
sell. However, it does leave a shadow of doubt over ownership in general. How can
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you buy something without constantly living in fear that a rightful owner will turn
up and ask for it back?
In medieval times there arose a specific exception for a ‘market overt’: if Alice
steals Bob’s horse and then takes it to the local public market, where she sells it
openly between dawn and dusk to Charlie, then Charlie does indeed now own the
horse. Bob can still seek damages from Alice, or seek to have her transported to the
colonies or even hanged; but the horse is now Charlie’s. This incentivises people to
buy and sell at markets (which the king can regulate and tax), and also encourages
crime victims to go to the local market to check whether their property’s on sale
there, which in turn may deter crime.
Britain abolished the ‘market overt’ exception to the ‘nemo dat rule’, as lawyers
call it, in 1995 following abuse by thieves selling stolen antiques. But two exception
remain that are of possible relevance to some cryptocurrencies: for money and for
bills of exchange.
The nemo dat rule and its exceptions are discussed in the case of bitcoin by
Fox [Fox16], whose analysis we draw on and extend here. See also his book on the
law of money, especially chapter 8 [Fox08]. Now the USA has designated bitcoin a
commodity, but there is a lot of lobbying pressure to treat some of it, or at least
some cryptocurrencies, as money; Japan has gone as far as designating it ‘virtual
money’ while other countries treat it as money for some purposes [Gla18]. In the
UK, the tax authorities treat it as foreign currency for the purposes of value-added
tax but as a commodity for income tax. There is a survey of cryptocurrency status
by Freshfields according to which there appears to be nowhere that treats bitcoin
simply as money [Fre18]. In the most important jurisdiction of all, the USA, it is
treated as a commodity.
In what immediately follows, we will assume that bitcoin is a commodity We
will explore what the consequences might be if it comes to be treated as money, or
as a bill of exchange, in section 6. For present purposes, all we need to know is that
someone who receives money or a bill of exchange in good faith and for value can
get good title to it. Unless cryptocurrencies acquire this privileged status, there is
no general exception to the nemo dat rule – so a theft victim can pursue and retrieve
his stolen property.
First we need to look at what governments are already doing to help crime
victims and to olice the sector generally.
2.1 The push for bitcoin regulation
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the US Patriot Act, the Treasury Depart-
ment’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) led a worldwide push to
standardise anti-money laundering (AML) measures in order to make life harder
for those who finance terrorism, and for others involved in serious crime. These
measures include regulation of money service businesses (MSBs), which include not
just banks but also remittance services, foreign exchange dealers, and businesses
such as law firms that handle clients’ money. MSBs are generally required to have
know-your-customer (KYC) measures that typically involve knowing the ultimate
beneficial owner of a corporate body, and in the case of a personal customer, getting
a copy of their passport or ID card, plus a proof of address such as a utility bill.
By 2013, Bitcoin had been forced on the attention of the US authorities by Silk
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Road, a website operated as a Tor hidden service that enabled people to buy and
sell drugs by post. The key innovation was that payments could be made anony-
mously using bitcoin. (This service may have significantly increased the demand for
bitcoin, raising its price from the tens of dollars to the low hundreds.) In March
2013, FinCEN issued regulatory guidelines directing miners and exchanges to reg-
ister as money service businesses, and in May seized US accounts belonging to Mt.
Gox, a Japanese bitcoin exchange that had failed to register. In September, the
FBI arrested Ross Ulbricht, the Silk Road operator, and seized BTC 26,000 from
his computer. The price of bitcoin crashed from $145.70 to $109.76 – but other
online drug marketplaces were set up and the price quickly recovered. (Such illegal
enterprises continue to turn over about half a million dollars a day [SC15]; for a
detailed study of post-Silk-Road drug markets, see Bhaskar et al. [BLM17].)
In February 2014, Mt. Gox (then the second-largest bitcoin exchange) ceased
trading and filed for bankruptcy, reporting that BTC 744,000 had been stolen. This
is the largest cryptocurrency theft to date in terms of number of bitcoin; there have
been bigger thefts in terms of dollar value, with perhaps 10% of all the money raised
recently through Initial Coin Offerings having been stolen [She18]. It is commonly
estimated that somewhere between 6–9% of issued bitcoins have now been stolen at
least once [Lov14, Gra18].
Cryptolocker was the pioneer ransomware, spread from September 2013 to May
2014 by the Zeus botnet. It was a malware program that would encrypt your hard
disk and demand a ransom in bitcoin for the decryption key. It also appears to
have moved the price of bitcoin, and it has had many followers and imitators since
– notably the Wannacry malware (later ascribed to the government of North Ko-
rea) which impacted a number of businesses, including the Spanish phone company
Telefónica and half a dozen UK hospitals.
It is harder to tell what proportion of bitcoin are crime proceeds, not least
because crimes vary by jurisdiction. Quite apart from Europol claims that $7-
8bn a year of European crime proceeds are now laundered through cryptocurren-
cies [Sch18], they have reportedly been used by residents of countries with exchange
controls, such as Russia, China and South Africa, to get their money out of the coun-
try1. India now outlaws the purchase of cryptocurrency using rupees. As the USA
and Europe don’t have exchange controls, exchange control offences are not recog-
nised there. Other grey areas include Uber’s decision to use bitcoin in Argentina in
2016 after the government there blocked its credit card payments.
Overall, therefore, one might suppose that somewhere between 10–20% of issued
bitcoin by value might count as the proceeds of crime, depending on one’s defini-
tions of crime. But it’s more complex than that, as coins are repeatedly split and
consolidated as they are spent. (We will discuss how to deal with this later.)
Against this backdrop, FinCEN’s efforts to compel bitcoin exchanges to register
as money service providers have made steady progress, with many governments
now following the US line. Their regulations vary quite a lot, though: while the
Philippines simply requires exchanges to register as foreign exchange dealers, Italy
has a decree on ‘virtual money’ which fairly comprehensive reporting requirements
– but which is vague about whether cryptocurrencies are legally money [BC18].
1Indeed the latest Bitcoin bull run started in October 2016 when the Renminbi dropped in value
against the dollar, driving the bitcoin price from the $600 at which it had been stable through the
summer to the high 700s
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Initially, some bitcoin exchanges only insisted on passports and utility bills from
customers who wanted to change cryptocurrency to or from dollars or other fiat
money, not on those who wished to change bitcoin for other cryptocurrencies such
as ether. During 2017, FinCEN raided several such businesses in the USA and es-
tablished their guilt in court [Har17]. Without such a rule, it would be trivial for
criminals to launder money by changing it from bitcoin to ether and back again.
FinCEN has also taken action against exchanges overseas, including BTC-e – which
apparently handled many of the bitcoin stolen from Mt. Gox2. Other countries
have taken even stronger measures; Germany, for example, has banned LocalBit-
coins (which let individuals trade cryptocurrency and normal money face-to-face)
and bitcoin ATMs [Han18], which are associated in the UK with laundering drug
money [CG17].
Japan, with many bitcoin users, has registered 11 exchanges, including market
leader BitFlyer, and in late 2017 had a further 17 applicants in the pipeline, all of
whom will have to not just know their customers and manage client money sep-
arately, but also meet minimum capital requirements [Rev17]. Twelve exchanges
that could not meet these criteria were shut down. South Korea has taken an even
more aggressive approach: bitcoin exchanges must pay tax and will soon have to
share customer transaction data with banks, to enable the detection of tax avoid-
ance [Mey18]. The announcement of this rulemaking broke the January bubble’s
bull run, causing a drop in bitcoin’s value of over 50% from the peak.
The latest turn of the screw comes from the European Commission, which
announced in November 2017 ‘empowerments to set-up and maintain a central
database registering users’ identities and wallet addresses accessible to financial
intelligence units’ [Jou17]. The original proposal was self-declaration forms for bit-
coin owners; however in December the Council decided that providers of wallet
hosting services will have to register as money service businesses. This change was
announced in May just as we were preparing the final version of this paper; we
describe its provisions in section 5.2 below. As most cryptocurrency owners now
appear to use online wallet services to hold their coins3, this will bring the great
majority of bitcoin transactions and holders within the regulatory net, at least to
the extent that they use regulated exchanges rather than rogue ones.
2.2 Bitcoin laundries
Given that the cryptocurrency market is now partially regulated, it is curious to see
money laundering services being promoted openly. Here the perspectives of lawyers
and bitcoin enthusiasts may be somewhat different.
Cryptographers have long worked on remailers or mixes, invented in 1982 by
Chaum, which enable email and other message traffic to be sent and received anony-
mously. If Alice wants to send an anonymous email to Bob, she can send it first
to Charlie and ask him to forward it to Bob. Chaum proposed that, to frustrate
naïve traffic analysis, Charlie would accumulate a number of encrypted messages
and mix them up before relaying them. If Alice doesn’t want Charlie to read her
2the available bitcoin mixes have nothing like the capacity needed to launder the proceeds of
such large crimes
3or at the very least, an app tied to online back-end and backup services, which amounts to the
same thing for present purposes
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message, she can first encrypt it with Bob’s public key. If she doesn’t want to let
her ISP (or a police wiretap) know she’s communicating with Bob, she can take the
message that’s already encrypted with Bob’s public key, and now encrypt it also
with Charlie’s public key, so that all the police see is a message to Charlie. If she
wants Bob to be able to reply to her, she can include a cryptographic reply coupon.
As we think of more and more possible threats, such systems become ever more
complex. The most common anonymity system, Tor, sends worldwide web traffic
through three nodes between your Tor browser and the server you wish to visit, so
that your anonymity is protected against one or two of them being compromised.
There is now a very substantial literature on anonymity systems, with all sorts of
clever attacks on them and complex trade-offs between performance and security.
Cryptographic ‘mixmaster’ remailers were a significant part of the cypherpunk
culture from which bitcoin emerged, and so it is unsurprising that various people
started offering mixing services for bitcoin, with evocative names such as bitcoinfog,
coinjoin and tumblebit. (A newer cryptocurrency, Zcash, has a kind of Aladdin’s
laundry: it lets users put their coins back in the mine and get out new coins that
are indistinguishable from other freshly mined coins.) Some of these ‘schemes’,
as cryptographers tend to call them, use clever tricks such as ring signatures and
smart contracts. Others are simpler; Möser et al reported that one bitcoin laundry
turned out to be just a single fat wallet, and if a customer paid in some bitcoin on
a Monday, the operator would return a slightly smaller sum on Tuesday [MBB13].
But whatever the quality of the mixing – in some technical sense – the underlying
idea is that if you put one black coin into a sack with nine white ones and shake
them hard enough, the output will be ten white coins.
However, we noted above that even if cryptocurrency become money, you have
to get coins in good faith in order to acquire good title; this is discussed exten-
sively by Fox [Fox16]. As all bitcoin transactions ever made are in plain sight on
the blockchain, the act of passing a bitcoin through a laundry should put all its
subsequent owners on notice that something may very well be wrong. Coin check-
ing has been discussed since at least 2013, coin checking services exist, and bitcoin
exchanges claim to do it. If coin checking is now a reasonable expectation, the likely
outcome of feeding one black coin and nine white coins into a bitcoin laundry isn’t
ten white coins, but ten black ones. When matters come to court, any laundries
that are clearly identifiable as such are likely to have exactly the opposite effect from
that asserted by their designers and operators. In short, people designing money
laundering mechanisms have been using quite the wrong metrics of quality. We will
return to this later.
Let us first consider how one might trace stolen bitcoins, from a purely technical
point of view.
3 Tracing the proceeds of crime
Every bitcoin consists of its entire history since it was mined. What a wallet stores
as a bitcoin is just a pointer to the relevant unspent transaction output (UTXO)
and the signing key needed to assign the value therein to someone else. However
the value derives from a series of pointers to previous transactions in the blockchain,
each of which has inputs and outputs, going all the way back to where the bitcoin’s
constitutive components were originally mined. So it is fairly straightforward to
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trace a transaction’s history, at least in principle. How might it work in practice?
There has been significant work already on tracing transactions and analysing
their patterns in the blockchain; a good starting point is Meiklejohn et al [MPJ+13].
For convenience, bitcoin operators use multiple wallets and pass money between
them using automated scripts; change wallets are used to break up large amounts
and give change, while peeling chains are used to pay multiple recipients out of a
single wallet and multisource transactions are used to consolidate small sums into
larger ones. (If this is unfamiliar, the book by Narayanan et al. [NBF+16] describes
bitcoin mechanics in detail.) Clustering analysis can link up the different wallet
addresses used by a single principal; we noted that Meiklejohn identified over half
a million addresses used by Mt. Gox, then the second-largest bitcoin exchange.
Commercial blockchain analysis firms do this at scale. Their customers are typically
law enforcement, and those exchanges who wish to do due diligence on payments to
and from third parties.
There is also research by academics trying to understand and map out the ecosys-
tem. Seminal papers were by Ron and Shamir who traced a significant number of
Silk Road bitcoin that the FBI had missed [RS13], and two papers by Möser, Böhme
and Breuker. In 2013, they used test transactions to analyse the operation of Bit-
coin Fog, BitLaundry and other anonymisation services [MBB13]; in the second,
they present a detailed analysis of how taint tracking might work through multiple
transactions [MBB14]. Their focus was on two algorithms for dealing with multi-
source transactions of which one input was tainted: these were ‘poison’ (whereby the
whole output is tainted) and ‘haircut’ (where the output is tainted by the percentage
of input value tainted). It appears that ‘haircut’ tainting is a default.
The commercial blockchain analysis firms are cagey about their methods – their
terms of service typically require customers not to reverse engineer their algorithms.
They employ staff to make multiple small payments into and out of both exchanges
and the underground merchants using bitcoin, use clustering analysis to link together
the wallets each actor uses, and then track the flows between them; the focus is at the
application layer of payer and payee intent rather than at the level of the blockchain.
Whatever the details, coin checking appears to be accepted good practice; even some
rogue bitcoin exchanges claim to do it.
Curiously, there is no publicly-available blacklist for the blockchain, tracking
coins that are reported stolen, extorted or otherwise proceeds of crime. Blockchain.info
used to make one available [MBB13], but this has been discontinued.
3.1 Practical tracing on the blockchain
So we set out to construct our own taint of the blockchain, and then to make test
purchases of due diligence reports to see how they compared.
Our work had started in the context of a project to measure the cost of cy-
bercrime, where we sought to estimate the proceeds of ransomware by developing
analytics to spot ransom payments on the blockchain. Starting with cryptolocker,
we rapidly found 3,500 infections in 2013–4, generating millions of dollars in ransom
payments. However, ransomware patterns have become more complex over time and
the parameters have to be tuned carefully to avoid false positives. It also appears
that quite substantial sums obtained by ransomware may have mixed in with crime
proceeds from underground drug markets. We therefore wanted better tools to trace
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the flows of bitcoins of mixed origin.
To get ground truth on tainting, we started with some addresses of reported
bitcoin thefts 4, collected from online reports, and tracked the stolen coins forwards
through hundreds of thousands of blocks. At this point we encountered the difficulty
already described by Möser et al. Bitcoins are not only split into smaller amounts
in change transactions, but also joined together by multisource transactions. Over
thousands of blocks of transactions, ‘haircut’ tainting smears the taint over the
actively traded bitcoin stock. Bitcoin laundries are designed to make this even
worse.
We therefore studied tainting more closely, and discovered that legal scholars
already have an interesting answer.
3.2 Clayton’s case
In English law, there is a long-standing legal precedent on tracing stolen funds. It
was established in 1816, when a court had to tackle the problem of mixing after
a bank went bust and its obligations relating to one customer account depended
on what sums had been deposited and withdrawn in what order before the insol-
vency. Clayton’s case (as it’s known) sets a simple rule of first-in-first-out (FIFO):
withdrawals from an account are deemed to be drawn against the deposits first
made to it [vN16]. Although a judgment of the High Court in London, the legacy
of the British Empire and Commonwealth ensured that this principle has become
embedded in the law of many other countries too [vHMtQ03].
The FIFO rule makes tracing bitcoins deterministic and, at least in principle,
straightforward. The 744,000 bitcoins stolen from Mt. Gox can be traced to the
same amount5 available as UTXOs for spending at addresses on the blockchain
today. In what follows, we will assume FIFO tainting as a default, except where the
circumstances of a set of transactions mandate a different approach – as with bitcoin
laundries or mixes, where the manifest bad faith directs us to use poison tainting
instead. There are also different rules where one of the principals in a transaction
is a trustee, which might be the case if a bank or investment fund were buying and
selling bitcoin on behalf of clients.
3.3 Empirics of FIFO tainting
We constructed a first attempt at a FIFO taint starting from a few well-publicised
coin thefts6, and ran it from the genesis block to 2016, we found that it concentrated
the taint more than a haircut tainting strategy does.
For example, the 2012 theft of 46,653 bitcoin from Linode now taints 16,855,619
addresses, or just over 93% of the total, if we use the haircut algorithm; with FIFO,
it’s 245,120 or just over 1.35%. More recent hacks spread the taint even less; for
example, the 2014 Flexcoin hack (where ‘the world’s first bitcoin bank’ closed after
all their coins were stolen) now taints only 15,265 accounts if we use FIFO, but
10,421,112 (or over 57% of all addresses) if we use haircut.
4132 in our first paper [ASA18] and 56 in this one
5less burned coins
6data from https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=576337.msg6289796#msg6289796
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The reasons should be clear from the graphics here. Imagine that the red bitcoin
input to a transaction are stolen, the green ones are blacklisted as they’re from Iran,
the blue ones have been marked by an anti-money-laundering screening program as
the output of a bitcoin laundery, and the yellow ones are the proceeds of drug sales
on an underground forum. The question is: which of the outputs of each transaction
is tainted, and to what extent?
Figure 1: poison tainting Figure 2: haircut tainting
Figure 3: FIFO tainting
The poison diagram shows how all outputs are fully tainted by all inputs. In the
haircut diagram, the percentages of taint on each output are shown by the extent
of the coloured bars. The taint diffuses so widely that the effect of aggressive asset
recovery via regulated exchanges might be more akin to a tax on all users.
With the FIFO algorithm, the taint does not go across in percentages, but to
individual components (indeed, individual Satoshis) of each output. Thus the first
output has an untainted component, then the stolen component – both from the
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first input – and then part of the Iranian component from the second input. As
the taint does not spread or diffuse, the transaction processes it in a lossless way.
This means that we can trace a bitcoin’s heritage backwards as well as tracing taint
forwards, and we can do tracing extremely efficiently once the appropriate index
tables have been built.
3.4 Empirics and incentives of taint tracking
The existing taint-tracking services have two customers: law enforcement and intelli-
gence agencies, who typically focus on serious crimes such as underground drug mar-
kets and multimillion-dollar hacks of exchanges, and the provision of coin-checking
services to exchanges and financial institutions who want to be able to demonstrate
that they exercised due diligence when acquiring cryptocurrency assets.
Now due diligence is well known to suffer from perverse incentives. No banker
really wants to know that one of his clients is a mafiosi, and certainly no banker
would be comfortable with a law that made him strictly liable if a customer turned
out to be one. Lobbying pressure from financial institutions leads to risk man-
agement morphing into standardised due diligence procedures that can be applied
mechanically – of which the standard requirement that new bank customers show a
passport and two utility bills is a good example.
We therefore made a number of test purchases of AML reports on specific UTXOs
which we identified as suspect. In one case, a ‘Standard AML/KYC Risk Report’ as-
sesses a tainted coin as ‘medium risk’, noting ‘illicit activity risk’ (but giving two risk
levels of 64% and 11% with no explanation), and unquantified ‘Danger detected’ for
‘transactions impeding track of funds’ and ‘transactions with distinctive patterns’.
Other reported categories for which danger was detected included cybercrime risk,
industry risk and connected parties. Yet this coin contained a significant component
that had been publicly reported stolen. In a second case, a checking firm returned
‘scam alert: none’ to one of the main Cryptolocker addresses and also to the main
Sheep Marketplace theft laundry address. In a third case, a checking service gave
the all-clear to an address being used by cryptomining malware distributors on an
underground forum scraped by colleagues at the Cambridge Cybercrime Centre.
When we asked one firm why they stopped publishing negative recommenda-
tions and removed old ones from their websites, they said they ‘wouldn’t match
risk appetite of every user thus we can only provide risk assessment and leave the
decision to the user.’ In short, the due-diligence market is not just a market for
lemons, but one in which many customers show at least symptoms of information
avoidance [GHL17].
The incentives facing firms who supply blockchain intelligence to law enforcement
are better. If hundreds of online test purchases of drugs provide evidence of drug
dealers laundering their proceeds through an unregulated exchange such as BTC-e,
this may provide probable cause for a warrant. And indeed the sales pitches of
such firms target major crime. Bitfury, for example, claims in its sales presentation
that by the end of August 2017, the Wannacry attackers had collected 53.46 BTC,
approximately 52 BTC of which were transferred further; they name the HitBTC
exchange as the destination of some of the extorted funds. Their pitch is that
‘investigators could catch the perpetrators of such crimes much more efficiently,
potentially preventing significant damage’ [Bit18]. (We will consider what’s actually
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involved in recovering money from HitBTC later.)
But there are still shortcomings: the leading police and intelligence agencies tend
to focus more on big busts, rather than on protecting ordinary consumers. This is
already a problem in frauds using normal banking and payment systems; despite the
fact that most property crimes in developed countries are now frauds rather than
burglary or car theft, the resources devoted by most police forces to ‘cybercrime’ are
tiny and they push crime victims to complain to their bank when they can, or even
blame the victim for the crime [And16]. Given the common police view that bitcoin
users tend to acquire cryptocurrency with a view to buying drugs online, it is even
less likely that they will bestir themselves to help ordinary bitcoin crime victims,
and we have come across no sign of such enforcement action. If ordinary people are
going to use cryptocurrencies at all, how can they protect themselves?
We therefore decided to make our blockchain taint public. It will display deter-
ministic tracking of reported crime proceeds and will also support analytics to spot
tumblers and some non-reported crimes such as ransomware. We hope to facilitate
the emergence of an open crime-tracking community, first, as a resource for innocent
bitcoin users to check out coins they’re offered in payment; second, as a resource
for small law-enforcement agencies who don’t have the budget to buy in specialist
services; third, as a platform for academics studying cybercrime; and fourth, as a
means of mitigating the lemons market in due diligence.
We call our public database of blockchain taint ‘the taintchain’. We are making
it available at http://www.taintchain.org and the software via the Princeton
BlockSci project.
3.5 What else our new tools can tell us
Although the focus of this research project was looking at the proceeds of ran-
somware and then at the proceeds of crime more generally, FIFO taint tracking can
be used for other research purposes. In particular it can be used to analyse local
money flows, local clustering and other economic factors that lie somewhere between
micro and macro. We observe for example that some bitcoin have been repeatedly
circulated by bad actors, having been stolen more than once. We observe that taint
from theft becomes entangled with taint from drug trafficking and from the trade
in cybercrime tools. These are topics for further papers and for research by others
now that our tools are available to all.
4 Dealing with crime proceeds
We are not the first to propose a public blacklist. The Bitcrime project produced
recommendations in January 2017 to the effect that Europol should maintain a
public blacklist for Europe [BGP+17]. However that was developed in the context
of German privacy law and recommended that the public blacklist contain only the
taints resulting from coin crimes on which a court had made a final decision.
4.1 Theft reporting in theory
The Bitcrime authors were concerned about the rights of bitcoin holders who might
be falsely accused, and about the property rights not just of the immediate recipients
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of disputed coins but about the rights of subsequent holders. The Bitcrime authors
therefore proposed that when bitcoin crimes are reported, the affected coins would
go on a blacklist maintained privately by the local prosecutor’s office. With tens
of thousands of prosecutors worldwide, this does not really scale. And attackers
might launch a service-denial attack on the taintchain by making large numbers of
malicious theft reports. Prudent practice is to require victims to report crimes in
person to the police. There are also issues around forensics, but these are already
familiar from the investigation of conventional bank frauds.
In English law, there is no statute of limitations for theft and, so long as bitcoins
are commodities rather than money or bills of exchange, the original owner can
demand them back. This should apply with particular force if stolen coins end up
in the wallets of bitcoin exchanges that are regulated financial service firms; and
once hosted wallet service providers fall under the EU’s 4th anti-money laundering
directive from November 2018, it will apply through them to the great majority of
everyday users. There should be effects on other actors too. FIFO tainting will taint
not just regular transaction outputs but also mining fees. Mining pools will therefore
have an incentive to avoid mining tainted transactions, and there are various ways to
do this without the overhead of making thousands of taintchain lookups per block,
such as by mining only blocks from regulated actors.
It would be bizarre if regulators did not eventually require licensed exchanges to
confiscate crime proceeds; Europol is already complaining of their lack of coopera-
tion [Sch18]. Governments already seize drug-traffickers’ money and vehicles under
local asset-forfeiture laws [Eco17], and it will be natural to extend this effort to
cryptocurrencies, which facilitate many other crimes too [VM15b, VM15a]. Rapid
automatic taint tracking has the potential not just to return stolen bitcoin auto-
matically to crime victims but to cut the incentive for a number of other crimes
too.
So we wrote a technical paper with some early results [ASA18], publicised it with
a Computerphile video [And18a], and waited for some theft reports to roll in.
4.2 Theft reporting in practice
Talking to real victims and looking at real theft cases has led us to radically revise
our view of the cryptocurrency world. With one exception, the victims we talked to
were using hosted wallets7. So rather than downloading wallet software and running
it on their own machine, they had simply gone to an online service – typically a firm
that was also an exchange – and exchanged their dollars, euros or pounds for bitcoin.
When they logged on, a balance was displayed to them, and they could spend it by
entering a payee and an amount, just like at a conventional bank website.
In one case (one of the thefts from Mt. Gox) the theft was clearly by an insider;
our complainant reported a bitcoin balance that amounted to thousands of dollars at
the time had simply gone to zero, with an insider presumably having intercepted the
password or bypassed the password-checking mechanism. The outgoing transactions
for that day include a set of four equal transactions, closely spaced in time, equal to
the missing amount. That is the extent of the traceability. The liquidators of Mt.
Gox have shown little interest in such small cases.
7At least at the time of the theft; one had BTC 42 in a desktop wallet, and after he transferred
it to a hosted wallet, it was stolen by an exchange insider
12
Other cases are similar although it is generally less clear whether the compro-
mise resulted from a customer’s credentials being guessed, or stolen by malware, or
whether there was inside collusion. In no case could we find any clear documentation
of the actual ownership of the missing cryptocurrency.
On inspection, this opens up a number of cans of worms.
5 How the market really works now
Although the hosted ‘wallet’ of the exchange customer is represented as being essen-
tially similar to a self-hosted wallet, which contains a signing key that can be used
to authenticate a transfer of a UTXO to another blockchain address, the reality
is different. Exchanges appear to keep most of the bitcoins that their customers
think they own in offline machines known as ‘cold wallets’ for security reasons, and
transfer bitcoin to and from them several times a day so that ‘hot wallets’, or online
machines used for actual trading, have enough bitcoin to transact but not so much
as to pose a catastrophic theft risk.
If that were the only optimisation introduced by the exchanges then it would
matter little for coin tracing. If the bitcoin I bought from, or deposited at, an
exchange were kept faithfully for me and made available for me to spend when I
wished, then a stolen coin I received would still be traceable through my hands when
I spent it later. This may have been the case at the time of Mt. Gox, but it does
not appear to be generally the case now. A big change has taken place over the past
eighteen months.
5.1 Who owns the bitcoin stock anyway?
There are two basic models for an institution to hold value on behalf of a customer.
The first is the gold merchant. If I pay (say) £30,000 for a 1Kg bar of gold, the
merchant would in the old days place a sticker on that bar in his vault with my name
on it8. If the merchant went bust, I could turn up at the vault with my paperwork
and collect the gold from the receivers; it was my gold after all, and the company
was merely keeping it for me.
The second model is the bank. If I had placed my £30,000 at HSBC, then the
bank does not stick my name on 1,500 £20 notes; it merely owes me the sum of
£30,000. If it goes bust, I have to stand in line with all the other creditors to get
my share.
Similarly, there are basically three ways you can buy and hold cryptocurrency.
1. You buy it from an exchange and get them to transfer it to your own wallet
which is resident on your computing device and that contains your private
key(s). This is the equivalent of collecting your gold from the bullion dealer
or withdrawing your cash from the bank.
2. You buy it from an exchange and keep it there in a hosted wallet where the
exchange holds the private key(s) on your behalf and the cryptocurrency actu-
ally resides in that wallet, in the sense that the keys are available to no other
customer. Here the exchange actually has control over your keys and executes
8nowadays the bars have QR codes
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transactions on your behalf, but only in respect of your cryptocurrency. This
is the equivalent of the gold merchant who keeps identifiable and marked gold
bars on behalf of customers. You can buy, hold and sell gold without actually
taking possession of it, and you can even order it to be transferred to the
account of a different customer of that merchant, but it is identifiably yours.
We will call this ‘the gold merchant model’.
3. You buy it from the exchange and keep it in an account where you have a claim
against a certain amount of cryptocurrency that the exchange is holding in its
own wallet on your behalf. In other words, your balance is off-blockchain and
intermediated by the exchange. This is typically how investors work as the
exchange simply runs an account for them which is backed by the exchange’s
assets. The exchange might not actually possess assets that correspond exactly
to its liabilities to its customers; it might lend cryptocurrency to other ex-
changes, trade in futures and options, and so on. The exchange may also offer
transaction services whereby they will remit various cryptocurrency amounts,
at your mandate, to the internal or external accounts of other parties. In other
words, the exchange is operating as a bank. This appears to be the dominant
business model but exchanges seem to be reluctant to spell this out in their
contract terms. Anyway, we call this ‘the bank model’.
We have read the terms and conditions of a number of bitcoin exchanges and not
one of them makes clear whether the exchange is like a gold merchant, selling you
specific units of cryptocurrency and keeping them safe for you, or like a bank in that
you merely have a claim against a certain quantum of its aggregated cryptocurrency
assets.
Users appear to believe that the former is the case while industry insiders seem
to assume it’s the latter, and the blockchain appears to bear this out – as does the
experience of theft victims.
We therefore looked at the accounts filed by the leading UK exchange, Coinbase.
It consists of two companies, CB Payments Ltd., which holds customers’ fiat money
balances and is now regulated under the E-money Regulations, and Coinbase UK
Ltd. which handles digital currency and is not regulated. According to accounts
filed at Companies House, the first of these companies shows an operating loss of
£162,760 in the year to December 2016 (the only year for which accounts have been
filed) and a balance sheet of £958,874 – the amount left after its shareholders’ funds
of £1,121,635 were reduced by that amount. The second company is more substantial
with a balance sheet showing £23,386,921 of creditors, balanced by £22,326,568 of
cash, customer deposits and trade debtors. Such accounts have been filed for several
years, the amounts roughly doubling each year. They appear to contain no record
of digital currency assets.
Of course, the UK Coinbase companies are part of a larger group, so perhaps all
the digital currency assets are kept by the US parent; and the boom in off-balance
sheet transactions has taken place since the accounting date in question. A recent
press profile of Coinbase emphasises its commitment to compliance and notes that
it has $20bn in assets under management [Par18]. Nonetheless such a small balance
sheet would be considered odd in a UK bank with an overseas parent. If the total
market cap of cryptocurrencies is £300bn, and the UK’s share of that is in line with
its 5% share of world GDP, and Coinbase has a third of the UK market, then we’d
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expect to see a balance sheet of £5bn, not £20m. Alternatively if the UK is 20% of
the size of the US market and Coinbase has the same share in both, we’d expect to
see $4bn. In short, we’re out by two orders of magnitude. Looking for a hint, we
note that Coinbase claims that all customer funds are kept in its cold wallet, with
only 1% of the total being in its hot wallets for trading at any one time, and that
this 1% consists of its own reserves [Par18].
It is curious that we see no trace of customers’ pooled assets on the Coinbase
balance sheet, which does not look anything like that of a bank. Perhaps the assets
appear on the balance sheet of a different group company, or perhaps Coinbase has
transitioned from being like a gold merchant to being like a bank in the seventeen
months since the last accounts were filed. Certainly Coinbase goes out of its way to
present itself as the good guy in the Wild West of cryptocurrency and we are not
imputing any impropriety whatsoever. But if even the best actors fall short of the
standard of transparency normal in legacy banking, this raises further questions, to
which we will return in section 6.
5.2 Off-chain transactions
In practice, Alice goes to a bitcoin exchange and pays it (say) £1000. The exchange
gives her (say) BTC 0.17 and displays this balance as being available to her to
spend. If Alice now orders a payment of BTC 0.05 to Bob, then the exchange looks
to see whether Bob is also a customer. If so, then the transfer is just a ledger entry;
the balance seen by Alice reduces to BTC 0.12 while Bob’s increases by BTC 0.05.
This is known in the trade as an ‘off-blockchain transaction.’ These appear to have
become the default over the period 2016–18.
The idea that off-chain transactions might become the norm was in fact first
mooted by bitcoin pioneer Hal Finney: ‘Bitcoin itself cannot scale to have every
single financial transaction in the world be broadcast to everyone and included in
the block chain... Most Bitcoin transactions will occur between banks, to settle net
transfers. Bitcoin transactions by private individuals will be as rare as. . . well, as
Bitcoin based purchases are today.’ [Dem18]
Getting hard data on the scale of off-chain transactions is harder. Demeester
reports that Western exchanges do $80m in off-chain transactions per day [Dem18];
while charts by Cryptovoices show trading volumes per on-chain transaction taking
off from early 2017 and showing peaks in the range of 6 to 14 times with a recent
average of about 8 [Cry18]. There have been various attempts to create off-chain
payment mechanisms between exchanges but it appears, talking to industry insiders,
that the great bulk of off-chain payments (at least for bitcoin) are between customers
at the same exchange. One of the drivers appears to have been the massive conges-
tion in the blockchain in late 2016, when transactions could wait in the mempool
for a day before being mined into the blockchain and transaction fees hit $50; now
many blocks are partly empty and mining fees are near zero. All such figures need
to be treated with caution: Ribes investigated various bitcoin exchanges via test
transactions and concluded that the largest exchange at the time was faking 93%
of its trading volume; the Chinese and Russian exchanges were generally suspicious
when assessed using his methodology [Rib18].
In effect, crypto-currencies are morphing rapidly into an unregulated shadow
banking system. While this may have been driven by congestion, it has a secondary
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effect of consolidation: network effects appear to be pushing particular communities
to consolidate round specific exchanges. Many bitcoin users in the USA and the UK
use Coinbase, while Chinese speakers are more likely to use Binance, Japanese use
bitFlyer and South Africans use Luno. It’s convenient to use the same exchange as
your counterparties: transactions are instant and fees are much lower – as bitFlyer
explicitly notes in their marketing material. Gandal et al. noted that cryptocurren-
cies showed network effects up till about 2014 as transaction demand dominated,
favouring bitcoin; then for a period the network effects vanished as investment de-
mand took over [GH14]. Now it seems that network effects are kicking back in
thanks to off-chain transcations. We really need better data on all this.
5.3 The e-money directive
The fact that substantial transaction volumes are now handled off-blockchain raises
the issue of whether financial regulators in Europe should require exchanges to
comply with the E-money Directive of 2009 [EMD99]. According to this, “electronic
money” means ‘electronically stored monetary value as represented by a claim on the
electronic money issuer which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making
payment transactions; is accepted by a person other than the electronic money issuer;
and is not excluded by regulation’.
This regulation seeks to ensure, inter alia, that an issuer of prepaid debit cards
has and maintains enough assets to back the credit balances on the cards that it
currently has on issue. Exactly the same problem arises with bitcoin exchanges:
what is to stop a exchange taking my money and displaying to me a credit of
bitcoin (or other cryptocurrency assets) than it does not actually have? What is to
stop an exchange selling $200m worth of bitcoin but buying only $100m in actual
bitcoin, taking out the other $100m as dividends for its shareholders, and hoping to
get away with it for a while? The rate at which exchanges have gone bust should
warn regulators against complacency.
The text of the E-Money Directive appears to describe an exchange’s transaction
processing business well. So do financial regulators make exchanges comply with this
Directive, via the regulations that implement it in each Member State? The answer
appears to be no. In the UK it is down to the Financial Conduct Authority to
instruct the Payment Services Regulator to apply the E-Money Regulations (2011)
to particular payment systems; the Regulator tells us that as the FCA has not in-
structed her to regulate cryptocurrencies, she only applies the Regulations to the
conventional currency balances kept at UK bitcoin exchanges. We will return to
the FCA’s position in 5.5 below. Meanwhile, their reluctance to regulate anything
other than the fiat money component of a transaction is exploited by the exchanges.
Coinbase’s terms and conditions [Coi18], for example, make a clear distinction be-
tween ‘E-money services’ which relate to customer sterling balances, are regulated,
and are provided by CB Payments Ltd., while ‘digital money services’ are provided
by a separate company Coinbase UK, Ltd. We are warned ‘You should be aware that
the risk of loss in trading or holding Digital Currencies can be substantial. Digital
Currency Services are not currently regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority
or any other regulator. You should therefore carefully consider whether trading or
holding Digital Currencies is suitable for you in light of your financial condition.’
The situation in Germany is similar, but with different details. The regulator,
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Bafin, has held back from imposing e-money regulation on cryptocurrencies with
the argument that they do not represent any claims on an issuer, as there is no is-
suer, so they are not e-money within the meaning of the German Payment Services
Supervision Act (Zahlungsdiensteaufsichtsgesetz); bitcoin are however financial in-
struments, units of account like foreign exchange with the difference that they do
not refer to a legal tender9 [Aut18a]. Bafin does note that ‘Those buying and selling
VCs commercially in their own name for the account of others carry out principal
broking services which are subject to authorisation and remarks in passing that ‘In
practice, VC undertakings often did not offer detailed explanations as to how they
work at all, or did so in a vague manner. In many cases, no general terms and
conditions were provided.’ And there has been enforcement action: Bafin has issued
cease and desist notices to ban the promotion of the ‘OneCoin’ trading system in
Germany [Aut17b] and an unlicensed broker, Crypto.exchange GmbH [Aut18b].
The OneCoin case is particularly interesting because the cease-and-desist order
related to the company’s not having an e-money license in respect of Euro remit-
tances made within Germany to acquire Onecoins [Aut17a]. In that case, players
in the system were ‘merely adjusting balances’ to transfer funds. In any case, an
institution providing off-blockchain transactions at scale would appear to fall under
1.1(1)5 of the the German Payment Services Supervision Act as they are ‘enter-
prises that provide payment services either commercially or on a scale that requires
a commercially equipped business operation’.
In short, in both the UK and Germany, the law empowers the regulator to re-
quire that digital currency operators who settle payments by means of off-blockchain
transactions to register under the E-Money Directive, yet they have so far neglected
to do so. Perhaps the cryptocurrency scene is simply moving too fast for them;
the explosion in off-chain payment volumes seems to have happened since the start
of 2017. Once they catch up – perhaps being forced to act by some scandal – the
tools already exist. The UK E-money Regulations, for example, provide two years
in prison for operating an e-money service without a license10.
Once we realised that regulators were failing to apply applicable law to tackle
the risks around off-blockchain transactions, we made a submission to the UK Par-
liament’s Treasury Committee describing these risks and recommending that the
E-money Regulations be applied to exchanges’ digital currency services as well as to
their customer balances in fiat currency [And18b]. We amplify that recommendation
below, along with others on which our thinking has developed since our submission
to parliament.
5.4 Directive PE CONS 72/17
On May 12th, the European Union published Directive PE CONS 72/17 [Uni18],
with the snappy title of ‘Directive of the European Parliament and the Council
amending Directive 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for
the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives
2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU’. This was agreed quietly between the European
Parliament and the Council (the Member States) in April, somewhat changes the
regulatory landscape. Although it is justified as an antiterrorism measure, it will
9This could of course be fixed if some microstate could be persuaded to declare it to be such
10There is a survey of the regulatory status of cryptocurrencies in various countries at [Fre18]
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have implications for consumer protection.
In December the Commission had signaled that regulation would be extended
from exchanges to wallet hosting services. The new Directive does this but in a way
that leaves a significant loophole.
The new Directive has at page 40 a definition of a ‘custodian wallet provider’
which is just about services that hold cryptographic keys. Recall that in section 4 we
described two models of exchange wallet operation: the gold merchant case where the
wallet provided by the exchange to its customer contains merely the cryptographic
keys needed to sign transactions with the customer’s own cryptocurrency assets, and
the bank case where the customer merely has a claim on the exchange’s asset pool.
This definition covers the gold merchant case but fails on the bank case – which is
what actually happens in practice.
The Directive says at recital 10 that virtual currencies (as it calls cryptocurren-
cies) should not be confused with electronic money, since although they can be used
for payment, they can be used for other things too. This text does not exclude the
application of the E-money Directive to off-blockchain transactions but may be used
to confuse matters and argue that exchanges should continue to have a regulated
business for fiat e-money balances and an unregulated one for digital currencies.
The Directive’s intent is clarified (if that is the right word) on p39 that the
definition of electronic money is that given in Directive 2009/110/EC: ‘electronically,
including magnetically, stored monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer
which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment transactions
as defined in point 5 of Article 4 of Directive 2007/64/EC, and which is accepted
by a natural or legal person other than the electronic money issuer’. That seems to
cover off-blockchain payments fair and square, and to our mind on-chain payments
too. There is also a definition of ‘virtual currency’ at p40 as ‘a digital representation
of value that is not issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority, is
not necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does not possess a legal
status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons as a means
of exchange and which can be transferred, stored and traded electronically.’
However most of the substance of the new Directive consists of detailed amend-
ments to the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive which can only be under-
stood by painstaking cross-reference to the original. Some of the intentions are clear
enough, such that there should be centralised systems recording the relationship
between addresses and identified holders, which can be queried automatically by
investigators on the trail of money laundering or terrorist financing (recital 21). Of
real importance may be section 6: ‘Member States shall prohibit their credit in-
stitutions and financial institutions from keeping anonymous accounts, anonymous
passbooks or anonymous safe-deposit boxes’ (page 44). The directive also requires
better public disclosure of the ultimate owners or beneficiaries of companies and
trusts.
The lawgiver has in this case been contemplating only the money-laundering
aspects of bitcoin exchanges, and not the fact that anyone can open an exchange
and sell more bitcoin then they have. In addition to this consumer-protection risk
there may also be a prudential risk, namely that the apparent $350bn market cap
of the cryptocurrencies currently in issue may not be all that’s at stake.
We are not lawyers, but feel that financial regulator should do more. As some
Member States (notably Malta but also Estonia and the UK) try to market them-
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selves an natural homes for cryptocurrency innovation, there will be a temptation
to race to the bottom.
5.5 Positions of UK stakeholders, April 2018
The UK parliament’s Treasury Select Committee called an inquiry into digital cur-
rencies to which many interested parties (including the first author) made submis-
sions in April 2018. Following oral hearings, the written evidence was published on
May 22nd, just before the final deadline for this paper. The submissions make for
interesting reading.
We already noted that although off-chain transactions appear to fall squarely
under the EU E-Money Directive and the UK E-Money Regulations, the Payment
Services Regulator can’t apply them as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has
not asked her to. The FCA explains its position in its Treasury submission [FCA18].
It follows the definition in EU Directive PE CONS 72/17 in that it sees wallets as
storing keys (p1); there is no recognition or mention of off-chain transactions in its
table of which operations around cryptocurrencies may or may not be regulated (p2),
and like the European Commission sees wallets as simply storing the customer’s
cryptographic key (p1). It does not use the word ‘currency’, preferring its own
term ‘crypto-assets’ which further helps ignore off-chain transactions, and claims
‘Where crypto assets form part of regulated services, regulated firms can take steps
to mitigate the money laundering risks’ (p6). This may be somewhat optimistic
given that Coinbase has separate firms for fiat money and crypto and carefully
states in its terms and conditions that only the former is regulated, but the FCA is
not too worried: unlike the EU, it sees the money-laundering risk as mostly in ‘non-
crypto asset typologies’. This position brings to mind the literature on information
avoidance [GHL17]. The FCA appears to be shying away from a problem it should
fix but which would complicate its mission. If it wants "crypto-assets" to be treated
exactly the same way as shares in Tesco, then it should forbid regulated exchanges
from providing any service that allows one customer to transfer them to another
directly as a means of payment. But it does not.
The FCA is not the only institution that just doesn’t want to know. The UK
Financial Reporting Council, in its submission, discusses the difficulty of valuing
crypto-assets. They should be valued at market if they are financial assets, but they
don’t meet the definition; so they have to be valued at cost as commodities, unless
we change the rules to treat them like gold. However, this just isn’t on the agenda
of the International Accounting Standards Board.
6 Broader policy implications
So regulators are just not managing to keep up, and policy perspectives have changed
hugely in three years. The 2015 survey of bitcoin economics, technology and gov-
ernance by Böhme et al. now seems to come from a different century [BCEM15].
The number and scale of the scams together with the environmental harm caused by
mining have created a consensus among governments and central bankers in favour
of regulation, but so long as this is based on an outdated view of the problem it’s
not likely to be optimal.
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In this section, we put forward some recommendations for discussion based on
the state of play as we see it in May 2018.
Our main recommendation is that governments should regulate exchanges
in the EU, or that do business with EU citizens, and which offer off-blockchain
payments or consolidate cryptocurrency assets rather than merely holding crypto
keys on behalf of customers, in respect of all these cryptocurrency assets under
the E-Money Directive. Off-chain transactions, at the very least, fall within the
definition of e-money and are vulnerable to exactly the kinds of scams and payment
service failures that the E-Money Directive was established to prevent.
If regulators continue to believe that cryptocurrency exchanges fall outside the
definition of e-money, then we will need a similar directive (let’s call it the c-money
directive) to tackle the same problems. But that would just waste everybody’s time.
We have a workable law, and just need to enforce it.
What more might be needed?
6.1 Consumer protection
A crime victim who asks an exchange for a refund of stolen bitcoin that were stolen
from an account there can expect to be told that as digital currency is unregulated,
they are out of luck.
But this is nothing new. In fiat banking, a customer who complains of phantom
withdrawals from her account used to get into an argument with his bank who
stonewalled her with something like ‘Our systems are secure so you must have been
negligent or collusive.’ Yet the law eventually caught up in most countries. In the
USA, early court cases paved the way for Regulation E and Regulation Z which
provide much of the consumer protection on which bank customers rely in card
transactions [vC80]. In the EU, the Payment Services Directive requires that the
contract terms governing the use of the payment instrument must be ‘objective, non-
discriminatory and proportionate’ (article 69), and where a transaction is disputed,
‘it is for the payment service provider to prove that the payment transaction was
authenticated, accurately recorded, entered in the accounts and not affected by a
technical breakdown or some other deficiency’ (Article 71) [PSD00]. Crucially, ‘the
use of a payment instrument recorded by the payment service provider, including the
payment initiation service provider as appropriate, shall in itself not necessarily be
sufficient to prove either that the payment transaction was authorised by the payer
or that the payer acted fraudulently or failed with intent or gross negligence to fulfil
one or more of the obligations’ (Article 72). European law not only agrees that
payment records are not constitutive of title to money; they also impose reasonable
constraints on what may be expected of users. Simply saying ‘you should have
chosen a better password’ won’t do; neither will ‘the blockchain now says that your
money belongs to Fred.’
At this point a conflict may arise if the provider’s terms of service say ‘you can’t
sue us’ while consumer-protection law holds such contract to be unfair. Again, the
Payment Services Directive comes into play, and there are other laws too around un-
fair contract and product liability. These can give some clarity if policy degenerates
into a tussle over the burden of proof.
So our second recommendation is that the relationship between an exchange
and its customer should be covered by the second Payment Services Directive.
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6.2 Unregistered exchanges
Unregistered and downright criminal exchanges are an issue. Suppose that you
were hit by the Wannacry ransomware, had paid a ransom, and wanted to get your
money back. According to the US government, Wannacry was the work of North
Korean government agents, but this isn’t much help. So you note from the BitFury
report that almost all of the bitcoin collected by Wannacry was laundered through
the HitBTC exchange, so you want to serve a court order on them (whether for
compensation, or merely to see the passport presented by whoever cashed those
coins). You then find that their website does not contain a physical address for
service, contrary to the E-commerce Directive, Article 5.1(b) of which requires ‘the
geographic address at which the service provider is established’ to be provided. A
quick Google search reveals that others, including disappointed customers, have
sought this information repeatedly; in 2014 someone purporting to represent HitBTC
said that their business headquarters was in Copenhagen while their R&D was in
Tallinn, and the address of the former would be provided ‘soon’. (We’re still waiting.)
Others looked for the company name that appears on the website, and found a
similarly-named UK company that had been deregistered in 2009. HitBTC does
claim to abide by FATF rules, so where is it registered as a money service business?
The Directive requires at 5.1(e) that it publishes ‘where the activity is subject to
an authorisation scheme, the particulars of the relevant supervisory authority’ yet
there is no sign. It should perhaps surprise no-one that HitBTC is on Ribes’ list of
exchanges that appear to significantly overstate their trading volume; he uses the
word ‘fraud’ [Rib18].
HitBTC is believed in the industry to be run by criminals in Russia, and pro-
motes ICOs heavily – which is likely to involve offences under securities law in other
countries. If it turns out that HitBTC is in a noncompliant jurisdiction, so it can’t
be raided and shut down, then conversations need to turn to sanctions, and whether
regulated exchanges should be permitted to transact with such operators at all. Un-
regulated exchanges also pose a direct risk to users; Moore and Christin reported
in 2013 that of 40 bitcoin exchanges, 18 had already closed, with customer account
balances often wiped out [MC13]; their later study in 2017 showed that things had
not improved [MCS17].
The means to do this exist in the new anti-money-laundering directive discussed
earlier, which imposes a duty in respect of transactions involving high-risk third
countries, which must be presumed to apply to HitBTC and BTC-e. Article 11 re-
quires EU institutions to implement a number of enhanced due-diligence measures
on such transactions including getting more information on the customer, the ben-
eficial owner, the nature of the business relationship, the source of funds and the
reasons for the intended transactions (p 50). What’s more, the EU institution doing
such a transaction must have it approved by senior management. It is hard to see
how a UK exchange could discharge these duties in respect of a transaction to or
from HitBTC.
Again, this is nothing new. Cryptocurrencies do not solve the underlying prob-
lems that made bank regulation necessary, and we can expect that many of the
familiar second-order problems will also reappear in due course.
Our third recommendation is that regulators should prohibit the cryptocur-
rency exchanges they regulate from clearing and settling transactions with unregu-
lated exchanges.
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6.3 Innovation and the role of central bank cryptocurrency
Debate continues on whether bitcoin and blockchains have actually achieved any-
thing other than emitting carbon dioxide and facilitating crime. Stinchcombe argues
that ten years into its development, nobody has found a legal killer app for bitcoin
yet [Sti17]. ‘Each purported use case – from payments to legal documents, from
escrow to voting systems – amounts to a set of contortions to add a distributed,
encrypted, anonymous ledger where none was needed. What if there isn’t actually
a use case for the blockchain at all?’
But the markets still believe otherwise, and the recent surge in ICO valuations
suggests that the future direction may be the use of smart contracts as a platform for
innovation. Such applications generally use Ethereum, a system similar to Bitcoin
but with a more expressive scripting language; from the legal viewpoint, they are
simply contracts whose enforcement is automated.
As Raskin notes, ‘innovative technology does not necessitate innovative jurispru-
dence’ [Ras17]. In fact, a decent starting point is the existing law on vending ma-
chines and on the starter interruptors used to enforce some motor vehicle credit
agreements. But although smart contracts are nothing especially new, regulatory
intervention may be needed in egregious cases. Attempts to hide contracts behind
machines have failed in the past: an early vending machine was invented by a 17th-
century book publisher, Richard Carlile, who did not want to be jailed for selling
books considered blasphemous. He argued that the purchaser’s contract was with
the machine, not with him; the court didn’t buy this argument, and sent him to
jail. The fact that he flaunted his attempts to evade prosecution made the case an
easy one for the court [Ras17]. We can expect courts to be similarly unimpressed by
contracts that are unfair, unconscionable or illegal; that are made using the visible
proceeds of crime; or that are clearly contrary to public policy.
Regulators will have to think carefully about what regulation might mean if
ether payment mechanisms are embedded in millions of low-cost devices. This will
be made more complex by gas, the ether that is used up to pay for running smart
contracts.
In this context, both regulators and entrepreneurs should consider common-mode
failure risks. People have noted for some time that bitcoin is not as decentralised
as some of its promoters claim. Gervais et al. raised this issue in 2014 [GKCC14],
and Narayanan et al. expanded on it in their book [NBF+16], noting that a number
of players – from the Bitcoin Core developers through the mining cartels to the
exchanges – have some power in the system. Recently, Vorick has told the story of
an attempt to set up a mining equipment vendor, which revealed that Bitmain now
has a near-monopoly in the mining equipment market [Vor18]; it now apparently
earns $4bn a year [Eco18, dV18].
Indeed, as Narayanan and his coauthors noted, the amazing and noteworthy
thing about bitcoin is that it continues to operate as a (sort-of) global trusted
computer despite having various parts of its kill chain controlled by vendors, miners,
developers and exchanges. However many people expect a denouement sooner or
later, and this is one of the reasons that central banks might consider a properly-
engineered cryptocurrency to be worthwhile.
A quite different approach is that being pursued by the Enterprise Ethereum
Alliance, who have adapted blockchain technology to work in closed groups. Nawaz,
for example, describes a project at JP Morgan to use enterprise ethereum to auto-
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mate the clearing and settlement of financial assets – which would not only enable
the financial institutions who are members of an exchange to manage the asset
register collectively. This enables the common-mode failure risks, the risks of trans-
acting with criminal counterparties, and the more traditional solvency and liquidity
risks, to be managed transparently. (The proposal would also make the assets pro-
grammable, so that participants could offer futures, options and other derivatives
of arbitrary complexity – which may raise other regulatory issues, but they are not
our concern here.)
So how might central bankers help?
Bitcoin promoters have hoped for some years that bitcoin would become fungible,
in the way that coins are – one coin is as good as any other. One way of promoting
fungibility was by providing mixes and other money-laundering facilities, but, as we
have discussed, such facilities do not work very well and are counterproductive as
they simply taint the laundered coins as being crime proceeds.
Another approach has been to argue that bitcoin should be money. If it is, then
there are two exceptions to the ‘nemo dat quod non habet’ rule: money, and bills
of exchange. In the case of money, you can get good title to stolen money if you
received it in good faith and for value. Thus if you get a $20 note in change from
a high street store, and it was actually stolen in a robbery last year, your acting
in good faith cures the defect in title; and the same happens if you get it from an
ATM. However if you trade something for cash with a shady character in the car
park of a transport cafe, then the circumstances of the sale are sufficient to put you
on notice that all may not be what it seems. If the money then turns out to be the
proceeds of a robbery, you’re out of luck.
The simplest way for a cryptocurrency to become money would be for a central
bank to issue it. If the Bank of England were to provide cryptocoins saying, as
banknotes do, ‘I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of £20’, then anyone
who holds such a coin would be able to rely on it11.
A ‘LegitCoin’, for want of a working name, would thus have powerful advantages
over competitors: certainty of title, trust in it as a platform, and predictable value.
So it is of great interest to hear that a consortium of Japanese banks is preparing to
launch ‘J coin’, a digital currency convertible into Yen at par, with the backing of
the Bank of Japan, and in time for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics [AL17]. The E-Money
Directive would apply immediately and directly, at least in Germany, as such a coin
would have a defined value.
So why should a central bank issue cryptocurrency? The best reason, as we see
it, is to support innovation by providing a platform for smart contracts whose tokens
can be converted into real money at par. If smart contracts are to provide a new
infrastructure for entities in the Internet of Things to act as autonomous economic
agents, simplicity and certainty will be of real value. Firms promoting businesses
based on smart contracts should not have to contend with a wildly fluctuating
exchange rate between ether and sterling, nor with the uncertainty that comes from
dealing with coins that may previously have been crime proceeds. (A third source
of uncertainty is technical: the programming language used to create the smart
11The general exemption from the nemo dat rule is bills of exchange, which include cheques, bills
of lading, and indeed banknotes. We’ve kept the discussion to banknotes for simplicity. However
if we end up with central banks issuing cryptocurrencies that support smart contracts for supply
chain management, other bills of exchange will surely be constructed using them
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contracts, which in the case of ether is far from ideal.)
One of the pieces of existing infrastructure that central banks might consider for
smart contract functionality can be found in the Hyperledger project, a Linux Foun-
dation hosted project that aims to provide a multitude of permissioned blockchain
systems depending on the application. One of its subprojects, Hyperledger Fabric12,
looks promising given its use of a mature programming language, extensive architec-
ture modularity and wide industry support. Being in active development, however,
only time will tell if it lives up to its promise.
Our fourth recommendation is that central banks consider issuing a cryp-
tocurrency that supports smart contracts, has the legal status of a bill of exchange
and is redeemable at par for fiat money.
Meanwhile, the Japanese experiment will be worth watching.
6.4 Nature of ownership
As we’ve seen, a serious issue with existing exchanges is that it’s unclear whether
the bitcoins in the exchange’s cold wallet are owned by the customer (as with a gold
merchant) or by the exchange (as with a bank). The regulator should force exchanges
to make that clear in their terms and conditions. As we noted, exchanges used to act
sort-of like gold merchants (in the days of Mt. Gox) and appear to act sort-of like
banks now. The lack of clarity goes back at least to Mt. Gox. According to their
2012 terms and conditions, ‘it (MtGox) will hold all monetary sums and all Bitcoins
deposited by each Member in its Account, in that Member’s name as registered in
their Account details, and on such Member’s behalf.’ [Gox12] The comment of one
of the victims to us was: ‘It does not state that customers were signing up to a
fractionally reserved exchange, and so customers had the understanding that MtGox
(albeit in separate cold storage) actually possessed the bitcoins which customers saw
in their balances when they logged in.’
Indeed, at present the fungibility of bitcoin seems to flow from the lack of clar-
ity around ownership; although theft victims can trace stolen assets, they cannot
establish whether they actually owned these assets, and so cannot sue to get them
back. Clarity will enable the victims to sue either the exchange of which they were
a customer when the theft occurred, or the exchange in whose custody the bitcoin
now rest.
A separate policy issue is the nature of ownership of a digital asset. Some assets
exist by virtue of registration, patents being an example. With most assets, the
nemo dat rule makes the situation more complicated. Cryptographers assumed
that owning the private key associated with a bitcoin’s address was constitutive of
ownership, but the law does not accept this at all. If registration is to constitute
ownership (as with patents) there had better be a law to say so; but, as we noted
above, the EU Payment Services Directive says the opposite.
A legislature that made cryptography constitutive of ownership would violate
a number of established rights and principles, as we discussed. It would exclude,
or at least make more complex, legal reasoning about intent, agency, liability and
other issues that have already been discussed in the context of the law on digital
signatures. Probably the most that might reasonably be done is to treat the sig-
nature as a rebuttable presumption of ownership, following the electronic signature
12https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric
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directive [ESD99]. However that had such adverse effects on liability that qualified
electronic signatures found only very limited use. Here, we merely flag up such issues
as needing clarification, perhaps in the central bank study project we recommend
in the section above.
In any case, our fifth recommendation is that regulators compel exchanges to
make clear in their contracts with their customers whether they are custodians of
cryptocurrency assets that the customers own, or whether the assets are owned by
the exchange with the customers simply having a claim on the asset pool.
It is natural for exchanges to try to avoid stating publicly whether they are
trustees, banks or both, as either choice brings responsibilities. It is time for regu-
lators to force them to choose.
6.5 Dark market currencies
A further policy issue is how to deal with cryptocurrencies that are explicitly de-
signed to provide more substantial transaction anonymity or even unlinkability, such
as Zcash and Monero, and also to identifiable persons promoting anonymity services
on bitcoin and other public and address-identifiable blockchains. In the case of
Zcash, the system works like bitcoin except that coin holders can have their coins
re-mined, so that they become indistinguishable from other recently mined coins.
The analysis in this paper would suggest that when a tainted coin is treated in this
way, all the coins then mined become tainted, and the victim would have a cause
for action against any of their holders.
Perhaps the victim could also sue the operators or promoters of such a system for
negligence – in that they knew that some wallets would be stolen and yet designed
a system that would make it impossible to get the money back. It’s not obvious
that this right would be extinguished by a legal precedent that declared ordinary,
traceable, bitcoin to be money. A related policy issue is what the law should consider
to constitute behaviour ‘in good faith’. We have argued here that bitcoin mixes are
certainly bad faith, and the use of systems like Monero might be held to count as
such.
However the new anti-money laundering regulations may settle the matter. As
noted above, article 6 requires that ‘Member States shall prohibit their credit in-
stitutions and financial institutions from keeping anonymous accounts, anonymous
passbooks or anonymous safe-deposit boxes’. A sensible transposition of the direc-
tive would discountenance anonymous instruments.
Our sixth recommendation is therefore that regulators should prohibit ex-
changes from buying and selling cryptocurrencies that are explicitly designed to
evade money-laundering and terrorist financing controls. Perhaps anonymity should
be restricted to cryptocoins issued by central banks, so that controls can be ramped
up later if the need arises. We note that Coinbase won’t touch Zcash or Monero,
and that Coincheck has just joined them [Fun18]. But although the market might
separate the sheep from the goats eventually, it might take its time.
6.6 Capital requirements
If the only thing that could go wrong with a bitcoin was that it had been stolen,
and all thefts were promptly and dependably reported, then a technically competent
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exchange can write scripts to fragment all incoming coins into clean layers and stolen
layers. The payer could get value for the clean money, while the victims of theft get
their money back and the drug money can go into the local asset-forfeiture pot. We
call this satoshi sorting.
Satoshi sorting is not always a practical solution, though, for at least three
reasons. First, there are issues other than theft, such as whether drug money or flight
capital is to considered tainted – and some of these questions vary by jurisdiction.
Second, crimes are not always discovered and reported immediately; a big drug bust
may result in the tainting of coins in transactions from months or even years ago.
Third is the complexity of evidence. A victim of bitcoin theft may take time to
establish that fact and a theft report might only get to the taint chain after years
of litigation.
Thus valid claims against an exchange’s cryptocurrency assets can arise for
months to years after these assets are received. This risk cannot be managed by a
clearing period and it follows that, if exchanges are responsible under the E-money
Directive, or equivalently under securities law, for ensuring that the bitcoin balances
they sell to their customers are backed by cryptocurrency assets that are sufficient
in quantity and quality, then they will have to keep a significant level of reserves.
In order to set appropriate standards for reserves, proper accounting standards
are also needed. We noted that Coinbase – a leading exchange, which tries to be
one of the good guys – has published accounts that do not reflect the assets under
its control. In an ideal world, if Coinbase operates like a bank, we’d like to see its
balance sheet look like a bank’s balance sheet, and we’d like to have international
standards for capitalisation and reserves compatible with Basel III.
Yet according to the UK Financial Reporting Council, the accounting standards
needed for exchanges are just not there. Cryptocurrencies should be probably valued
at market as financial assets, but they don’t meet the definition; so they have to be
valued at cost, unless we change the rules to treat them like gold; but this isn’t even
on the agenda of the International Accounting Standards Board [Geo18].
Our seventh recommendation is therefore that regulators should require reg-
ulated exchanges to be adequately capitalised – and develop proper accounting stan-
dards to support this.
6.7 Mitigating environmental harm
Our final policy issue is serious and controversial: the ‘environmental disaster’, as
the Bank for International Settlements describes bitcoin mining. A recent detailed
analysis by De Vries puts cryptocurrency mining energy use at between 3 and 8
GW, that is, between Ireland and Austria; he notes that the current economics will
drive usage towards the latter figure [dV18]. Given the role of CO2 in anthropogenic
climate change and the relevant international agreements including the Paris treaty,
regulators should seek to mitigate the environmental damage done by miners, for
example by moving from proof-of-work systems to Byzantine fault tolerance or to
proof-of-X for various values of X. Asking bank regulators to make technology choices
might not be ideal, so perhaps the appropriate policy instrument here would be a
carbon tax on mined coins.
Various policy mechanisms might be used to get from here to there including
issuing central-bank cryptocurrencies or monetising existing crytocurrencies, but
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only where regulated entities such as exchanges, miners and wallet hosting firms
support adequate consumer protection mechanisms and pay their carbon taxes. The
market could then decide whether to moving to proof-of-stake coins, or even (if
they’re properly capitalised) of letting the exchanges run a ledger directly.
Our eighth recommendation is therefore that regulators decide how to levy
a carbon tax on cryptocurrency mined using proof-of-work methods, and that the
very minimum acceptable should be the Eur 33 per tonne floor of the Emissions
Trading Scheme.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we analysed the treatment of stolen bitcoins from legal, economic and
engineering perspectives. Technologists claimed that taint tracking was hard, as
they assumed that taint would mix and dilute when coins are joined; yet the relevant
case law specifies first-in-first-out tracking, which turns out to be technically easy.
Technologists also assumed that bitcoin mixing made coins derived from innocent
and stolen inputs innocuous, whereas the legal effect of attempts to conceal the
source of funds is to taint the entire output.
We discussed in section 2 the measures taken by many governments to tackle
the most urgent serious-crime threats including large-scale money laundering and
underground drug markets, notably by forcing exchanges to register and perform
basic due diligence on their customers. These have culminated in the EU’s amending
the fourth anti-money-laundering directive to bring wallet hosting service providers
as well, with effect from November 2018. However, this still only tackles the problems
of two years ago.
We discussed in section 3 how to make it practical to trace stolen coins on the
blockchain, at least in the theoretical world described in academic research. The
same applies to coins acquired via other crimes from ransomware to drug trafficking.
A public blacklist, run by Interpol, had already been proposed by Böhme and oth-
ers; as such institutions may take years to establish, we have constructed a public
taintchain for bitcoin, as a platform on which others may build. Our taint-tracking
software is being made available via the Princeton toolkit Blocksci.
In section 4 we explored the limitations on the use of taint-tracking in practice,
at least by individual crime victims, and went on to describe how many bitcoin
exchanges have started working since early 2017, with many off-blockchain trans-
actions and the ownership of the underlying bitcoins often obscure, at least in the
case of the hosted wallets now used for most transactions. In section 5 we described
how regulation has failed to keep up. While regulators have tackled the access and
egress points where real money is transferred into digital currency and vice versa,
they have failed to notice that the growing volume of off-blockchain transactions has
created an unlicensed shadow banking system. This will have to be regulated, just
as the real banking system is, and for precisely the same reasons.
In the absence of effective regulation, the cryptocurrency bubble is somewhat
like a teenage party that’s got a bit rowdy, and it’s time for the grown-ups to
take the punch bowl away. As a guide for future regulatory efforts, we make eight
recommendations in section 6, which we gather together here for convenience.
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1. The E-Money Directive must apply to exchanges doing business with EU citi-
zens which offer off-blockchain payments or consolidate cryptocurrency assets
rather than merely holding crypto keys on behalf of customers, in respect of
all these payments and assets.
2. The relationship between an exchange and its customer should be covered by
the second Payment Services Directive.
3. Governments should prohibit the cryptocurrency exchanges they regulate from
clearing and settling transactions with unregulated exchanges.
4. Central banks should consider issuing a cryptocurrency that supports smart
contracts, has the legal status of a bill of exchange and is redeemable at par
for fiat money.
5. Regulators should compel exchanges to make clear in their terms and condi-
tions whether they are custodians of cryptocurrency assets that the customers
own, or whether the assets are owned by the exchange with the customers
simply having a claim on the asset pool.
6. Regulators should prohibit exchanges from buying and selling cryptocurrencies
that are explicitly designed to evade money-laundering and terrorist financing
controls.
7. Regulators should require regulated exchanges to be adequately capitalised,
and develop proper accounting standards to support this.
8. Regulators should decide how to levy a carbon tax on cryptocurrency mined
using proof-of-work methods; the minimum acceptable should be the Eur 33
per tonne floor of the Emissions Trading Scheme.
We believe that existing laws can be used to tame the cryptocurrency jungle and
make it safer both for private users and for innovation. The most important next
step will be enforcing the EU’s E-Money Directive in respect of digital currency
assets held by EU exchanges on their customers’ behalf, as well as for balances of
Euros and other fiat money.
In the longer term, settling the legal status of digital currencies should be used
as an opportunity to move operators from the proof-of-work systems that now emit
more CO2 than Ireland, to alternative systems that do not do as much environmental
damage, by means of a carbon tax.
An interesting question is whether this would need new legislation, or even a
trade treaty (as might be needed, for example, to impose a tax on the embedded
carbon content of imported manufactures). If existing regulations can be used to
used to implement our other seven recommendations, perhaps they can be used to
enforce a carbon tax as well, by making it a condition of cryptocurrencies being
traded on regulated exchanges.
Anyway, we set out these recommendations as a basis for discussion.
28
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to David Fox, Richard Clayton, Alexander Vetterl, Johann Bezuiden-
houdt, Joe Bonneau, Shehar Bano, Nicolas Christin, Tyler Moore, Lawrence Ess-
wood, Sergio Pastrana and Emma Rengers for helpful comments.
References
[AL17] Martin Arnold and Leo Lewis. Japan’s big banks plan digital currency
launch. Financial Times, September 26 2017.
[And16] Ross Anderson. GCHQ helps banks dump fraud losses on customers,
2016.
[And18a] Ross Anderson. Stolen Bitcoin Tracing https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UlLN0QERWBs, 2018.
[And18b] Ross Anderson. Failures of trust and regulation in cryptocurrency, Apr
30 2018.
[ASA18] Ross Anderson, Ilia Shumailov, and Mansoor Ahmed. Making Bitcoin
Legal. Security Protocols Workshop, 2018.
[Aut17a] BaFin Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. necoin ltd, dubai: Pro-
hibition of involvement in unauthorised money remittance business, 18
Apr 2017.
[Aut17b] BaFin Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. Onecoin ltd
(dubai), onelife network ltd (belize) und one network services ltd
(sofia/bulgaria): Bafin issues cease and desist orders holding the com-
panies to stop own funds trading in “onecoins” in germany, 20 Apr 2017.
[Aut18a] BaFin Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. Virtual Currencies (vc),
2018.
[Aut18b] BaFin Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. Crypto.exchange
gmbh: Bafin orders cessation of unauthorized principal broking ser-
vices, 5 Feb 2018.
[BC18] Marco Bellezza and Eleonora Curreli. Italy: Towards a register for
cryptocurrencies operators. Medici, 13 Feb 2018.
[BCEM15] Rainer Boehme, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman, and Tyler Moore.
Bitcoin: Economics, technology, and governance. Journal of Economic
Perspectives v 29 issue 2, July 2015.
[BGP+17] Rainer Boehme, Johanna Grzywotz, Paulina Pesch, Christian Rueckert,
and Christoph Safferling. Prevaention von Straftaten mit Bitcoins und
Alt-Coins, 2017.
29
[Bit18] Bitfury. Use case – Crystal tracking ransomware pay-
ments. at https://crystalblockchain.com/files/Crystal-Use-Cases-
Ransomware.pdf, 2018.
[BLM17] V. Bhaskar, Robin Linacre, and Stephen Machin. The economic func-
tioning of online drugs markets. CEP Discussion Paper 1490, LSE, Aug
2017.
[Car18] Augustin Carstens. Money in the digital age: what role for central
banks? Bank for International Settlements, 6 Feb 2018.
[CG17] Rebecca Camber and Chris Greenwood. Drug dealers using bitcoin
cashpoints to launder money. Daily Mail, 4 December 2017.
[Coi18] Coinbase. Coinbase user agreement, 2018.
[Cry18] Cryptovoices. 24h trading volume Per On-Chain Payment, 2018.
[Dem18] Tuur Demeester. Bitcoin: digital gold or digital cash? Both., 10 Mar
2018.
[dV18] Alex de Vries. Bitcoin’s growing energy problem. Joule v 2 no 5 p801–
805, 16 May 2018.
[Eco17] The Economist. Why marijuana retailers can’t use banks, 2017.
[Eco18] How a few companies are bitcoining it. The Economist, May 19 2018.
[EMD99] Directive 2009/110/ec of the european parliament and of the council
of 16 september 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential super-
vision of the business of electronic money institutions amending direc-
tives 2005/60/ec and 2006/48/ec and repealing directive 2000/46/ec,
16 September 1999.
[ESD99] Directive 1999/13/ec of the European Parliament and the Council, 13
December 1999.
[Eur17] Europol. Drugs and the Darknet – Perspectives for Enforcement, 2017.
[FCA18] FCA. Financial conduct authority’s written submission on digital cur-
rencies, April 2018.
[Fox08] David Fox. Property Rights in Money. Oxford, 2008.
[Fox16] David Fox. Cyber-currencies in private law. University of Edinburgh,
2016.
[Fre18] Freshfields. Virtual currencies: how regulators treat it (snapshot, jan-
uary 2018), 2018.
[Fun18] Brian Fung. Move deliberately, fix things: How Coinbase is building a
cryptocurrency empire. Washingoton Post, May 17 2018.
[Geo18] Paul George. Frc submission to the treasury select committee digital
currencies inquiry, April 13 2018.
30
[GH14] Neil Gandal and Hanna Halaburda. Competition in the cryptocurrency
market. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10157, 2014.
[GHL17] Russell Golman, David Hagmann, and George Loewenstein. Informa-
tion avoidance. Journal of Economic Literature, 55 (1): 96-135, 2017.
[GKCC14] Arthur Gervais, Ghassan Karame, Srdjan Capkun, and Vedran Cap-
kun. Is Bitcoin a Decentralized Currency? IEEE Security and Privacy
Magazine v 12 no 3, 2014.
[Gla18] Phil Glazer. State of Global Cryptocurrency Regulation. Hackernoon,
21 Jan 2018.
[Gox12] Mt. Gox. Terms of use, https://web.archive.org/web/
20130906174719/https://www.mtgox.com/terms_of_service?
Locale=en_US, January 20, 2012.
[Gra18] Blockchain Graveyard, 2018.
[Han18] Andreas Hanl. Some Insights into the Development of Cryptocurrencies.
MAGKS Joint Discussion Series in Economics No. 04-2018, Marbueg,
2018.
[Har17] Peter Hardy. Failure to register with FinCEN sustains guilty pleas by
virtual currency exchangers. Money Laundering Watch, 2017.
[Her17] Alex Hern. Bitcoin mining consumes more electricity a year than ire-
land. The Guardian, 27 Nov 2017.
[Jou17] Věra Jourovà. Answer given by Ms Jourovà on behalf of the Commis-
sion. European Parliament, 3 Nov 2017.
[Lov14] Dylan Love. $500 million worth of bitcoin has been stolen since 2010.
Bitcoin Insider, 11 March 2014.
[MBB13] Malte Möser, Rainer Böhme, and Dominic Breuker. An Inquiry into
Money Laundering Tools in the Bitcoin Ecosystem. IEEE, eCrime 2013.
[MBB14] Malte Möser, Rainer Böhme, and Dominic Breuker. Towards Risk Scor-
ing of Bitcoin Transactions. Financial Cryptography, 2014.
[MC13] Tyler Moore and Nicolas Christin. Beware the middleman: Empirical
analysis of bitcoin-exchange risk. Financial Cryptography, February
2013.
[MCS17] Tyler Moore, Nicolas Christin, and Janos Szurdi. Revisiting the the
Risk of Bitcoin Currency Exchange Closure. ACM Transactions on
Information Technology, 2017.
[Mey18] David Meyer. South Korea reportedly plans to hit bitcoin exchanges
with massive tax bills. Fortune, 22 January 2018.
31
[MPJ+13] Sarah Meiklejohn, Marjori Pomarole, Grant Jordan, Kirill Levchenko,
Damon McCoy, Geoffrey Voelcker, and Stefan Savage. A fistful of bit-
coins: Characterising payments among men with no names. IMC 2013,
2013.
[NBF+16] Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller,
and Steven Goldfeder. Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies.
Princeton, 2016.
[Par18] Helen Partz. Hacked Crypto Exchange coincheck Confirms Removal of
Four Anonymity-Focused Altcoins. Cointelegraph, May 20 2018.
[Pop18] Nathaniel Popper. Bitcoin Thieves Threaten Real Violence for Virtual
Currencies. New York Times, 18 February 2018.
[PSD00] Directive 2000/31/ec of the European Parliament and the Council, 8
June 2000.
[Ras17] Max Raskin. The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts. I Geo L Tech
Review, 2017.
[Rev17] Nikkei Asian Review. Japan tries light touch in bringing cryptocurren-
cies out of regulatory limbo. 30 September 2017.
[Rib18] Sylvain Ribes. Chasing fake volume: a crypto-plague, 15 Jan 2018.
[RS13] Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir. How did Dread Pirate Roberts acquire
and protect his bitcoin wealth? IACR preprint 2013/782, Financial
Cryptography 2013.
[SC15] K. Soska and N. Christin. Measuring the longitudinal evolution of
the online anonymous marketplace ecosystem. In Proceedings of the
23rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security’14), pages 33–
48, 2015.
[Sch18] Mathew Schwartz. Criminals hide ’billions’ in cryptocurrency, europol
warns. Bank Info Security, 15 Feb 2018.
[She18] Lucinda Shen. Hackers have stolen $400 million from icos. Fortune, 22
Jan 2018.
[Sti17] Kai Stinchcombe. Ten years in, nobody has come up with a use for
blockchain, 22 December 2017.
[Uni18] European Union. Pe cons 72/17: Directive of the european parliament
and the council amending directive 2015/849 on the prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or ter-
rorist financing, and amending directives 2009/138/ec and 2013/36/eu,
May 12 2018.
[vC80] Judd v Citibank. 107 misc.2d 526, 1980.
[vHMtQ03] Wannan v Her Majesty the Queen. Ottawa, 2003 fca 423, 2003.
32
[VM15a] Marie Vasek and Tyler Moore. Analyzing the Bitcoin Ponzi Scheme
Ecosystem. Financial Cryptography, 2015.
[VM15b] Marie Vasek and Tyler Moore. There’s no free lunch, even using bitcoin:
Tracking the popularity and profits of virtual currency scams. Financial
Cryptography, 2015.
[vN16] Devaynes v Noble. 35 er 767, 781, 1816.
[Vor18] David Vorick. The State of Cryptocurrency Mining, May 13 2018.
33
